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THERE IS NO FIRST AMENDMENT 
OVERBREADTH (BUT THERE ARE 
VAGUE FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINES); 
PRIOR RESTRAINTS AREN’T “PRIOR”; 
AND “AS APPLIED” CHALLENGES SEEK 
JUDICIAL STATUTORY AMENDMENTS 
Larry Alexander* 
In this short article I hope to clarify three doctrines that 
have produced enormous confusion among lawyers, judges, and 
academic commentators. These are the doctrines of First 
Amendment overbreadth, prior restraint, and as-applied (as 
opposed to facial) challenges. My purpose is entirely analytical, 
although analytical clarity will undoubtedly have normative 
implications, some of which I shall briefly note. 
I. FIRST AMENDMENT OVERBREADTH 
My title correctly suggests that there is no such thing as first 
amendment overbreadth despite its apparently well-established 
status as a first amendment doctrine. Indeed, given the 
conception of overbreadth—a statute is overbroad if it has some 
unconstitutional applications—that is utilized in what is taken to 
be first amendment overbreadth, there is no such thing as 
overbreadth in any constitutional domain. 
To see this, consider a hypothetical law that surely 
exemplifies first amendment overbreadth if any law ever does: 
“No person shall speak, write, or through any other medium 
 
 *  Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. I wish 
to thank David McGowan, Miranda McGowan, Grant Morris, Lisa Ramsey, Ted 
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seek to communicate any idea to any other person.” Surely, this 
hypothetical law is unconstitutionally overbroad, is it not? For a 
substantial number of its possible applications—though not all, 
as with fighting words, malicious defamations, child porn-
ography, incitements to imminent lawless action, etc.—are 
constitutionally immune from prohibition by virtue of the First 
Amendment.1 
But now consider this hypothetical amendment to my 
hypothetical overbroad law: “This law shall only apply to the 
extent that its application is constitutionally permitted.” If the 
law were so amended, would it now be overbroad? It is hard to 
see how it would be, as by its terms it now has no 
unconstitutional applications. 
But—and here is the key point—the hypothetical statutory 
amendment is already a part of every statute. For Article VI of 
the Constitution, which declares the Constitution to be the 
supreme law of the land, and by direct implication renders 
legally void any state or federal laws inconsistent with the 
Constitution, already accomplishes what the hypothetical 
amendment accomplishes.2 Or, to put it differently, there would 
be absolutely no cost in terms of statutory objectives for 
legislatures to append to all laws “to the extent consistent with 
the Constitution.” 
So my hypothetical amendment to my hypothetical 
overbroad statute, which by hypothesis eliminates the statute’s 
overbreadth, accomplishes nothing that is not already 
accomplished by Article VI. And this, of course, will be true of 
any statute. Therefore, there are no overbroad statutes, in the 
First Amendment domain or elsewhere. 
Note, however, that my hypothetical overbroad statute, 
even if it is not and cannot actually be overbroad, still seems 
oppressive and capable of chilling free speech. If not because of 
overbreadth, because of what? The chilling effect is a product of 
the vagueness of the first amendment tests that distinguish 
constitutionally-protected speech from speech that can 
constitutionally be prohibited. Those are the tests that eliminate 
the overbreadth. But because they are vague, they leave the 
statute they amend with quite vague margins. Even a citizen 
 
 1. Though as we shall see, even that seeming bedrock First Amendment truth 
must be qualified. See infra at note 8. 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 “This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land . . . .”). 
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well-versed in these first amendment tests—perhaps someone 
who has gone to law school or has even taught the First 
Amendment recently in a law school—will not be at all certain in 
a pretty broad swath of situations whether or not his proposed 
speech will turn out to be constitutionally protected under extant 
first amendment doctrines. Therefore, although my hypothetical 
overbroad statute is not actually overbroad, as truncated by 
Article VI or a statutory amendment to the same effect, it is 
quite vague and will likely chill a considerable amount of speech. 
That is its real first amendment vice. 
If my analysis of first amendment overbreadth is correct, 
and the vagueness of first amendment doctrines is the true 
source of the chilling effect worry, then this demonstrates the 
incoherence of some Supreme Court overbreadth decisions. The 
most prominent one is Gooding v. Wilson.3 The Supreme Court 
in Gooding struck down as “overbroad” a Georgia statute 
punishing offensive speech. The Court implied that it would not 
have struck down the statute had the Georgia courts limited its 
application to “fighting words” as defined in Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire.4 But the implication is nonsensical because the 
Georgia statute could not be validly applied except in 
accordance with Chaplinsky. Chaplinsky is already a part of the 
Georgia statute because the Constitution is already a part of the 
Georgia statute by operation of Article VI.5 So the Georgia 
statute was not—because it could not be —overbroad. On the 
other hand, if the vice of the statute was its vagueness due to the 
vagueness of the Chaplinsky “fighting words” test, then that vice 
could not have been cured had the Georgia court’s limited the 
statute to “fighting words,” the Court’s statement to the contrary 
notwithstanding. The Court’s rationale is internally 
contradictory. 
One final point. There are some laws that are, in a sense, 
overbroad in that they have no valid applications. Or, put 
differently, the Article VI proviso that is implied in every law 
obliterates such laws in their entirety. Such laws have no valid 
applications because they contain an illegitimate predicate for 
governmental action.6 
 
 3. 405 U.S. 518 (1972). 
 4. 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). 
 5. See Lawrence A. Alexander, Is There an Overbreadth Doctrine?, 22 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 541, 549 n.20 (1985). 
 6. See id. at 544–47. 
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Consider laws that ban flag burning, or speech by 
Republicans, or speech criticizing the government. These laws 
have no valid applications, not because every token of flag 
burning, speech by Republicans, or speech criticizing the 
government is constitutionally immune to regulation, but 
because such acts are constitutionally immune to regulation 
under rules the terms of which refer to certain disfavored ideas or 
persons. 
Consider flag burning. When the Supreme Court held it to 
be protected under the First Amendment, all it really held is that 
it could not be banned under laws that by their terms punish 
certain treatments of the flag.7 It did not suggest that even 
expressive uses of the flag could not be punished under, for 
example, laws prohibiting burning any object for any purpose in 
the street, or laws banning murder even if committed for 
expressive purposes by strangling someone with an American 
flag. Therefore, expressive uses of the American flag are not 
protected under the First Amendment except from laws that 
make those expressive uses the predicate for the prohibition.8 
 
 7. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 419 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 
310, 318–19 (1990). 
 8. In the earlier article I put the point this way: 
The Constitution’s individual rights provisions by and large do not protect 
specific conduct per se. . . . Rather, the Constitution ordinarily limits the types of 
reasons that government may act upon in regulating conduct. For instance, 
‘criticizing the government’ is not protected conduct viewed in isolation from 
the various ways government might attempt to regulate ‘criticizing the 
government.’ ‘Criticizing the government’ may be validly—constitutionally—
regulated if the criticism is broadcast from a soundtruck at night, and the 
regulation proscribes the use of soundtrucks at night. ‘Criticizing the 
government’ may be validly regulated if the criticism takes place on private 
property without the owner’s consent, and the regulation proscribes trespass. 
But ‘criticizing the government’ is not validly regulated if the regulation 
proscribes, or was motivated by a desire to proscribe, ‘criticizing the 
government.’ 
Now when a statute contains a constitutionally illegitimate predicate of 
government action, the statute is void and cannot be applied. If for instance a 
statute proscribes ‘picketing,’ ‘mutilating the flag,’ or ‘demonstrations by 
blacks,’ the statute cannot be applied as is, nor can it be applied even if 
narrowed to ‘violent picketing,’ ‘burning the flag in public,’ or ‘disruptive 
demonstrations by blacks.’ The narrowed statute still contains the illegitimate 
predicate for governmental action. 
Alexander, supra note 5, at 545 (citations omitted). I should point out that the 
hypothetical statute forbidding all communication is probably an example of a law 
containing an illegitimate predicate for governmental action and therefore has no 
constitutionally permissible applications. I should also note that overbreadth invalidation 
is not an example of “third-party standing,” as it is sometimes claimed. An overbroad 
statute, which I have said is a statute with a vague and chilling constitutional boundary, is 
a constitutionally infirm statute, just as are statutes that have constitutionally illegitimate 
predicates for government action. And anyone whose conduct is regulated by a 
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II. PRIOR RESTRAINTS AREN’T “PRIOR” 
Restrictions of speech found in criminal and civil laws are 
typically analyzed “substantively” —that is, by whether the 
content of speech is protected by the First Amendment against 
the particular way in which the law is restricting it, or by whether 
the time, place, or manner of the speech, whatever its content, is 
being unduly restricted. But there is one type of regulation of 
speech that is thought to be special and specially disfavored, the 
so-called prior restraint of speech. There are two types of 
regulation that fall into this category. One consists of those 
requirements that one obtain a license from some agency or 
person before engaging in the speech activity. Such requirements 
can be based on the particular content of the proposed speech, 
such as whether it concerns one’s activities with the C.I.A., or 
whether it is a film that might be pornographic. Or they can be 
based on the time, place, or manner of the proposed speech, 
such as whether it involves door-to-door solicitations, or whether 
it involves a demonstration that could impede traffic. The other 
type of regulation deemed to be a prior restraint is the judicial 
injunction or order when directed against the content of speech 
or its time, place, or manner. 
Now notice that neither license requirements nor 
injunctions are in any sense more prior as restraints than 
ordinary statutory and common law restrictions of speech. 
Compare them, for example, with some quotidian non-prior 
restraint of speech—say, a statute making it a crime to show X-
rated movies. Assuming no ex post facto application of the law, 
which would be a different issue, the requirement that one 
obtain a license to show an X-rated movie will, it is true, exist 
prior to the act of showing such a movie, as will an injunction 
 
constitutionally infirm rule has standing to object to it. 
Put differently, while violent picketing, burning the flag in public, and disruptive 
demonstrations by blacks are all activities that can be validly proscribed under 
some statutes—for example, statutes proscribing violence, public burnings, and 
disruptive demonstrations—violent picketing, burning of the flag, and disruptive 
demonstrations by blacks do not mark off legitimately regulatable subcategories 
of legitimately regulatable activities. They are therefore underinclusive with 
respect to legitimately regulatable activity. The government may ban all 
violence, but not just violence associated with picketing. The government may 
ban all public burnings, but not just those that involve the flag. And so forth. 
Id. 
I should add that there are conceptual mysteries that attend the Constitution’s focus 
on rules and their validity as opposed to act tokens and their immunity from regulation. 
See Larry Alexander, Rules, Rights, Options, and Time, 6 LEGAL THEORY 391 (2000) 
(discussing the past and future effect of rules and the permissibility of such rules). 
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ordering one not to show such a movie. But so does the statute 
making showing such a movie a crime. Both the statute and the 
so-called prior restraint are prior in that sense. Moreover, they 
are also alike in that the punishments they authorize occur after 
the acts that violate them—showing the X-rated movie in the 
case of the ordinary statute and the injunction, or showing it 
without a license in the case of the licensing requirement. 
So in what sense are the prior restraints materially different 
from ordinary statutory and common law restrictions on speech? 
The answer lies not in their “priorness” as restraints but in the 
consequences of violating them. To be sure, they all threaten 
violators with punishment. But in the case of ordinary statutory 
and common law restrictions, if they attempt to restrict speech 
that is constitutionally protected from such restrictions, the 
speaker can raise that protection as a defense to the charge of 
violation. In the case of the statute making it a crime to show X-
rated movies, the violator can claim that the statute violates the 
First Amendment and that therefore his violation of the statute 
cannot serve as the basis for punishing him. If his claim of 
constitutional right to show X-rated movies is accepted by the 
court, the court will throw out the charge against him. 
The case is otherwise with the licensing requirement and the 
injunction. Take the injunction first. If Al is enjoined from 
showing X-rated movies, and Al ignores the injunction and 
shows such movies, he will be punished for contempt of court. 
Moreover, and this is the crucial point, if Al, on being 
hauled into court on the contempt charge, protests that he has a 
constitutional right to show X-rated movies, and that the court 
constitutionally erred in enjoining him from doing so, his protest, 
even if correct, will not foreclose the court’s punishing him for 
contempt. This is because of a judicially-created doctrine called 
the “collateral bar rule.” That doctrine in essence says that 
judicial orders from courts that have jurisdiction over the person 
give rise to an absolute duty of obedience, notwithstanding any 
constitutional rights to engage in the enjoined conduct, unless 
and until that order is set aside by the court that issued it or by a 
higher court on appeal.9 
The upshot is that while legislative orders can be disobeyed 
and then challenged on constitutional grounds if suit is brought 
against those who disobey them, judicial orders cannot be. If Al 
 
 9. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 321 (1967). 
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is enjoined from showing X-rated movies, he must not do so on 
pain of certain punishment, unless and until the injunction is 
withdrawn or set aside on appeal. If Al wants to escape 
punishment, he must refrain from showing X-rated movies and 
seek to have the injunction overturned. This is not the case if Al 
is only statutorily prohibited from showing such movies. 
The vice of judicial “prior restraints” is then one of loss of 
time, which is a real cost if one’s message is time-sensitive. It is 
the time the speaker must wait before speaking during which he 
tries to convince some court that his speech is constitutionally 
protected and thus should never have been enjoined. If he is 
correct—his speech is constitutionally protected—then it is the 
time lost in fighting the injunction that he would not have lost 
had he been prohibited statutorily, a prohibition he could have 
ignored with impunity. 
That lost time is the temporal element in the prior restraint 
of an injunction. Notice the oddity that arises from the judicial 
antipathy towards injunctions of speech based on that loss of 
time. The loss of time stems from the collateral bar rule that 
elevates judicial orders above legislative orders (statutes) and 
administrative orders and rules. But the collateral bar rule is 
itself a judicial creation. If it were eliminated in instances of 
speech injunctions, the latter would operate like personalized 
statutes and like statutes could be disobeyed with impunity if the 
enjoined speech were constitutionally protected. In other words, 
the loss of time, which makes judicial injunctions of speech 
constitutionally disfavored, is solely a product of the judicially-
crafted collateral bar rule. The judges giveth, then taketh away! 
The foregoing analysis also shows why the Supreme Court 
dissenters were correct and the majority wrong in the case of 
Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.10 
In Vance, a court had issued an injunction that by its terms 
enjoined exhibiting movies that met the constitutional definition 
of unprotected obscenity. The majority overturned the 
injunction as an invalid prior restraint of speech. The dissent, 
however, pointed out that by the terms of the injunction, only 
films that were not constitutionally protected would constitute 
violations. Therefore, if Universal Amusement showed any film 
that it had a constitutional right to show, it would not have 
violated the injunction. And if it was hauled into court on a 
 
 10. 445 U.S. 308 (1980). 
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contempt charge, it would not need to raise a constitutional 
defense to that charge, something the collateral bar rule 
forecloses. Rather, it could use the constitutionally-protected 
status of the film to deny that it had violated the injunction. And 
denials of violations are, of course, not foreclosed by the 
collateral bar rule.11 
Let me turn now to the other form of prior restraint, the 
license requirement. This is the classic form of prior restraint, 
one that dates back to the English requirement of censor 
approval prior to publication. 
There is no collateral bar rule with respect to licensing 
speech, but there is something similar. For if the licensing scheme 
is itself valid, then the would-be speaker must wait until he gets 
the license, either directly from the licensing authority, or if 
denied by that authority, indirectly from having a court order the 
licensing authority to grant the license. That is because if the 
licensing scheme is valid, speaking without the license is 
punishable, even if, given the constitutionally-protected nature 
of the speech, the license should have been granted. 
Licensing schemes, like injunctions, hurt constitutionally-
protected speech most severely when the speaker’s message is 
time-sensitive. This suggests that licensing schemes should be 
evaluated constitutionally based in part on how time-sensitive 
the speech that requires a license is likely to be, as well as how 
expedited the licensing process and judicial reviews of denials 
are. Courts need not adopt a dichotomous valid or invalid 
approach to licensing schemes. They could, for example, deem 
them valid for a certain period of time after which their validity 
would expire and the speaker would no longer be required to 
seek the license. 
Moreover, the time-sensitivity of the speech is not the only 
relevant criterion in assessing licensing schemes. Frequently, the 
government and even the speaker have an interest in assessing 
the constitutional status of the speech prior to its communication 
to others. The government, for example, may believe that 
revelation of constitutionally-unprotected classified information 
will be irreparably damaging to its legitimate interests and so 
 
 11. It is true that the trial of a contempt charge will be before a judge and not a 
jury, whereas trials of statutory or common law violations will, at the option of the 
defendant, be before a jury as well as a judge. That distinction, however, has nothing to 
do with an injunction’s being more “prior” than a statute. Nor does it have any obvious 
implications for the First Amendment. (I thank Steve Smith for pointing out this 
distinction between injunctions and statutes beyond that of the collateral bar rule.) 
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would like to review any possible constitutionally-unprotected 
information before it is published. Indeed, the speaker himself 
will frequently be uncertain whether the classified information is 
constitutionally protected or unprotected, or whether it will 
injure vital government interests, something he, like the 
government, might wish to avoid. Therefore, both he and the 
government might welcome the prior-to-publication review 
process of a licensing scheme. And the same would be true of Al 
and his X-rated movies. Given the vagueness of the line between 
constitutionally-unprotected (obscene) X-rated movies and 
constitutionally-protected X-rated movies, if there is a statute 
that punishes showing the former, Al might welcome the 
presence of a licensing scheme that would determine on which 
side of the constitutional line his movies are located before he 
shows them, a scheme that eliminates the otherwise sizable risk 
of error he would run if he had to determine this for himself. An 
error on the side of caution would cost him revenue. An error on 
the other side would cost him a fine or jail time. The licensing 
scheme is a less risky and less costly alternative, particularly 
since X-rated movies will probably not have time-sensitive 
content. 
III. “AS APPLIED” CHALLENGES SEEK JUDICIAL 
STATUTORY AMENDMENTS 
When statutes are “facially” challenged, and the challenge is 
upheld, the statute is declared a legal nullity. Nothing of it 
remains that can be validly applied in any situation. (It may, of 
course, remain in the statute books. And if the court that has 
upheld the facial challenge to it is later reversed, or reverses 
itself, the statute may be resuscitated without the need for 
legislative reenactment.) 
Facial challenges are easy enough to comprehend. The rule 
in its entirety is constitutionally infirm. The reasons for this 
might be of many different types. One already mentioned is that 
the rule contains an illegitimate predicate for application, such as 
when it discriminates based on viewpoint or speaker (or on a 
multitude of other forbidden grounds, such as race, ethnicity, 
gender, alienage, age, disability, religion, etc. etc.). Another, also 
already mentioned, is when the rule is overbroad because of a 
vague and chilling constitutionally-imposed boundary. And 
there are still others, as when the law tramples on fundamental 
rights involving procreation and sexuality, or when local law is 
preempted by state law, or state law by federal law. 
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If constitutionally void laws subject to facial challenges are 
easy enough to comprehend, what about laws that are only 
unconstitutional “as applied”? What is their nature, and why do 
courts often say that as applied constitutional challenges are 
preferred to facial ones? 
Think about as applied challenges this way: Suppose rule R 
forbids doing act A in circumstances C. Suppose further that C 
covers a range of possible circumstances (C1, C2, C3 . . . CN). And 
suppose further that applying R to A in some of those 
circumstances—say, C4 and C5—would violate the constitutional 
rights of those who do A in those circumstances. Finally, suppose 
that the rule R&—”it is forbidden to A in C except in C4 and 
C5”—has no unconstitutional applications. Then an as applied 
challenge to R is a challenge to R that should be upheld only in 
circumstances C4 and C5, with the result that R will now be 
interpreted to be identical to R&. 
Notice, however, that if a court strikes down only those 
applications of R that occur in C4 in C5, it has actually amended 
R. It has severed R in C4 and C5 and left an amputated R that is 
now “R, except in C4 and C5,” or R&. (Or rather, per the analysis 
in Section I, the Court has recognized that the Constitution itself 
limits R to R&, and the Court has left R& in force.)12 Presumably 
then, a court should only entertain an as applied challenge in 
cases where it believes the legislature intends the statute to be 
severable, and severable at the particular joints at which the 
court is asked to sever it. In the case of R, that means that the 
court should only grant the as applied challenge if it thinks the 
legislature would prefer R& to nothing, R itself being constitu-
tionally ineligible. 
Thus, an as applied challenge to a statute is a call for the 
statute’s amendment by the courts. It is appropriate when some 
applications of the statute are unconstitutional, the statute 
amended to remove those applications would be constitutionally 
valid had it been enacted in that truncated form—it is not fatally 
underinclusive and does not contain an improper predicate for 
application—and the enacting legislature is presume to have 
preferred the amended, truncated statute to no statute at all.13 
 
 12. I thank Ted Sichelman for this point. 
 13. For a recent lengthier treatment of this topic, which is basically consistent with 
my analysis, see Alex Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges, 18 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 657 (2010). Kreit’s article also contains references to the earlier 
efforts to explain the distinction. 
!!ALEXANDER-272-FIRSTAMENDMENTOVERBREADTH3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/17/2011  9:42 AM 
2011] FIRST AMENDMENT OVERBREADTH 449 
 
*  *  *  *  * 
The first amendment doctrines of overbreadth, prior 
restraint, and as applied versus facial challenge are, as 
elaborated by courts and commentators, confusing. I have tried 
to clear up the confusion, not by clarifying those doctrines as 
they currently exist, but rather by showing what those doctrines 
would look like if they were analytically coherent and 
normatively attractive. 
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APPENDIX 
In a recent article, Nicholas Rosenkranz offers a novel and 
somewhat radical understanding of constitutional duties and 
rights. He asserts that some constitutional duties are imposed on 
Congress in its lawmaking capacity, and some are imposed on 
the executive in its application of laws to individuals.14 His 
leading example of a constitutional provision that speaks to 
Congress in its lawmaking capacity is the First Amendment and 
its command, “Congress shall make no law . . . .” When Congress 
passes a law abridging freedom of speech, establishing a religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise of religion, then according to 
Rosenkranz, Congress has committed a constitutional violation 
at the moment it passes the law, before the law is ever enforced 
against anyone. He is a bit vague about whose rights have 
thereby been violated—who has “standing” to raise the 
constitutional violation in court.15 But he is clear that Congress 
has violated the First Amendment when it passes the law—
presumably even if the law is never enforced. (Query: Would it 
violate the First Amendment if Congress, in the law, states that 
it should not be enforced?) 
There are several corollaries to Rosenkranz’s principal 
axiom. First, if a law is unconstitutional on the day it is enacted, 
it cannot become constitutional because of changes in the 
constitutional facts. Perhaps more importantly, the converse is 
also true: a law that is constitutional when enacted because 
supported by the underlying constitutional facts is always 
constitutional even if the supporting constitutional facts have 
disappeared—that is, even if the same law enacted today would 
be unconstitutional.16 
The second corollary that Rosenkranz draws from his 
principal axiom—and the one that bears most directly on my 
article—is that laws are either constitutional or unconstitutional 
“on their face” and are never unconstitutional “as applied.”17 A 
law that is constitutional on its face might be applied 
unconstitutionally by the executive, but that is a constitutional 
violation by the executive alone. If the law itself calls for that 
 
 14. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
1209 (2010). 
 15. Id. at 1247–48. 
 16. See id. at 1284–86. 
 17. E.g., id. at 1239, 1266–67. 
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unconstitutional application, then presumably the law is 
unconstitutional in toto and on its face. 
This second corollary conflicts with the analysis of “as 
applied” unconstitutionality that I have given. I have suggested 
that some statutes have parts—sub-rules—that are unconstitu-
tional but that are severable. On this view, statutes that do not 
contain illegitimate predicates can be decomposed into sub-
rules, some of which might be unconstitutional. If the remaining 
sub-rules are constitutionally permissible—and if the legislature 
would prefer retaining these permissible sub-rules over total 
invalidation of the statute—then the statute is only 
unconstitutional “as applied,” unless the “as applied” technique 
would leave the statute with a margin that is too vague 
(overbreadth, on my analysis). I cannot find any reason for 
rejecting the possibility that statutes might be partially 
unconstitutional and severable, either in Rosenkranz’s lengthy 
article or anywhere else. So I reject the second corollary, namely 
that statutes are never unconstitutional as applied, and stand by 
my analysis of as applied challenges. 
For what it’s worth, I also reject his first corollary and the 
principal axiom from which both corollaries are derived. The 
first corollary—that a postenactment change in constitutional 
facts cannot affect constitutionality—is bizarre. It entails that 
Congress has no constitutional obligation to monitor its statutes 
and repeal them when circumstances change in such a way that 
were they to enact the same statutes today, the statutes would be 
unconstitutional. It rests on the odd notion that constitutional 
adjudication is primarily an investigation into the culpability of 
the enacting Congress, not an investigation of the law’s 
contemporary effects and the culpability of the non-repealing 
Congress. 
Rosenkranz affirms this bizarre corollary largely because it 
seems to be entailed by his principal axiom that provisions like 
the First Amendment speak to Congress when it enacts laws—
and only then. But the principal axiom is doubtful. Consider this 
alternative conception of constitutional provisions like the First 
Amendment: “Congress shall make no law” is elliptical for 
“Congress shall have no power to make, as valid law, any 
‘law’ . . . .” Unconstitutional “laws” on this conception are of no 
legal effect. They only appear to be, but are not actually, laws. 
On this conception, the principal form of constitutional 
adjudication occurs only as a result of application, or anticipated 
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application, by the executive or the courts. That application 
might be thought of as a tort. If the plaintiff (the affected party) 
sues the official in tort, and the official defends by claiming the 
tort is not a tort because it was theorized by a law, the plaintiff 
would respond that the law, being unconstitutional and a legal 
nullity, cannot immunize the official. On the other hand, a law 
that is not enforced is of no constitutional significance. 
Rosenkranz’s analysis is bold, radical, refreshing, and 
unconventional. I have a fondness for analyses of this kind.18 But 
there is another virtue that it lacks. It is incorrect. 
In another recent article, Kevin Walsh has recently 
dissented from the analysis of severability that I have given in 
section III.19 Walsh correctly notes that severability calls for 
judges to make difficult counterfactual determinations regarding 
what a legislature would have wanted had it realized that its 
enactments were invalid and therefore unenforceable in some 
but not all of their applications. Would the legislature have 
wanted the enactment to be enforced to the full extent it could 
be validly enforced? Or would it want other valid portions of the 
enactment—or the entire enactment, or even other parts of the 
corpus juris—to be unenforced given the unenforceability of a 
sub-rule of the enactment?20 
These surely are difficult counterfactuals for judges. Indeed, 
the problem is difficult even if a legislature explicitly states that 
an enactment (or group of enactments) is inseverable and should 
be deemed to no effect if any application is held to be 
unconstitutional. That is so because if the first case to arise 
involves a constitutionally valid application, the judge will not 
know whether the application is authorized until he or she 
surveys all possible applications and concludes that none of them 
is unconstitutional. 
Walsh believes he has a solution to the difficulties of 
severability. For Walsh, constitutional judicial review does not 
involve eliminating statutes, much less parts thereof, but merely 
applying higher law where higher and lower law conflict. Walsh 
calls his approach “displacement”: The higher law of the 
 
 18. I have myself often tilted at the windmills of orthodoxy. See, e.g., LARRY 
ALEXANDER AND & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A 
THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW (2009); LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, 
DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL REASONING (2008); LARRY ALEXANDER, IS THERE A RIGHT OF 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION? (2005). 
 19. Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 N.Y.U L. REV. 738, 739 (2010). 
 20. Id. at 740–41. 
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Constitution displaces the lower law of statutes where there is, 
and only insofar as there is, a conflict between them.21 If an 
application of the statute is “displaced,” the statute remains on 
the books and in effect unless the state has also enacted a 
“fallback law,” that is, a law specifying what is to be done if an 
application of a statute is held unconstitutional.22 In other words, 
severability would be the result of an explicit legislative directive 
in a fallback law, not a judicial divining of the legislature’s 
counterfactual intent. 
Walsh’s “displacement and fall back law” proposal is 
actually just a conclusive presumption of severability in the 
absence of a fallback law. Unless the legislature specifies 
inseverability and its scope in a fallback law, no application of a 
statute will be struck down merely because some other 
application is unconstitutional.23 
A conclusive presumption of severability will make matters 
easier for the judge in a case that arises under a constitutional 
sub-rule after another sub-rule of the same statute has been held 
to be unconstitutional. It will not, however, help the judge when 
there is a fallback law declaring the enactment’s sub-rules to be 
inseverable if the sub-rule in question is constitutional and no 
other sub-rule has yet been declared unconstitutional. The judge 
will still have to canvas the enactment’s entire set of sub-rules to 
see if any one of them is unconstitutional before being able to 
decide the case at hand. 
Moreover, a conclusive presumption of severability will not, 
by itself, obviate the necessity of looking to hypothetical 
legislative intent unless it is supplemented by other 
presumptions. For consider those statutes that are 
unconstitutional because they offend some norm of equality, 
whether under the Equal Protection Clause or under dormant 
commerce clause analysis. The vice in such cases is that a burden 
or benefit has not been extended equally where the Constitution 
requires that it be so. Once the court holds the statute 
unconstitutional, however, there is a question of remedy 
remaining. Should the benefit be extended to the plaintiff (or the 
plaintiff be relieved of the burden), or should the benefit be 
 
 21. Id. at 777–78. 
 22. Id. at 780–81. 
 23. For a proposal on severability that points in the opposite direction from Walsh’s 
in the context of challenges to congressional legislation on the ground of absence of 
constitutional power, see Luke Meier, Facial Challenges and Separation of Powers, 85 
IND. L.J. 1557 (2010). 
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denied to the comparison class (or the burden extended 
thereto)? One might answer these questions by asking the 
counterfactual question, “What would the legislature have 
wanted in lieu of getting its desired unequal distribution?” Or 
one might establish a conclusive presumption in favor of, say, 
extending benefits (or removing burdens). 
Perhaps the most appropriate remedy would be to excise in 
toto whatever enactment or portion thereof contains the 
illegitimate predicate for benefits or burdens. If, for example, a 
welfare program is enacted that gives $1,000 per month to the 
poor irrespective of whether they are black or white, Democrat 
or Republican, Christian or Jew, but then the legislature passes a 
new law increasing the monthly payments to $1,500 but only for 
whites, or Democrats, and so on, the courts should strike down 
the new law but leave the prior law in effect. If, however, the 
original welfare law gave $1,500 per month to whites but only 
$1,000 per month to blacks, the appropriate remedy would be to 
eliminate that entire law and its welfare payments. Mere 
displacement, however, in the absence of a fallback law, does not 
by itself point to a remedy. For if a poor black sought the $1,000 
monthly payment, the court would have to decide what precisely 
had been displaced by the Constitution—the entire welfare law 
or only the $500 extra payment to whites. 
In any event, Walsh’s proposal may be meritorious as far as 
it goes, but it does not contradict the analyses of severability I 
have given. Rather, it proposes a way of determining severability 
other than by divining the legislature’s hypothetical intent. 
 
